Essay: Sex and Gender

Gender is said by many sociologists to be "socially constructed". But many feminists now insist that sex is socially constructed as well. This insight differs greatly from earlier feminist positions that saw sex as biological and gender as social/cultural. This is a fundamental difference in thinking, and thus has a wide range of implications, many of which are discussed below. In this discussion, very distinct definitions of "gender" and "sex" will be used - here, "gender" refers to "gender roles" (as coined by sexologist John Money (Money, 1955)) , and refers to "the array of socially constructed roles and relationships, personality traits, attitudes, behaviours, values, relative power and influence that society ascribes to the two sexes on a differential basis. ... gender is an acquired identity that is learned, changes over time, and varies widely within and across cultures" (Esplen & Jolly, 2006). "Sex", on the other hand, will be initially considered in a purely biological capacity, and can be defined as "the biological characteristics that define humans as female or male" (World Health Organisation, 2002, Gender and Reproductive Rights: Working Definitions). However it should also be noted that "(Sex) in human beings is not a purely dichotomous variable" (Geertz, 1983, p. 81), and that degrees of biological sexuality are possible. This definition was how feminists once viewed sex, but one will see how this has changed as the issue is pursued. Using these definitions, the implications involved in the differing feministic views on gender and sex will be discussed. These implications include, but are not limited to: what it means for sex to be socially constructed; and the impact a socially constructed sexuality has on the issues of intersexuality and transsexualism. Other implications include the changing position of feminism in today's society and what it means to be homo- or bi-sexual, however external constraints limit the length and depth possible in this discussion (for further debate on these issues, refer to the bibliography). While gender is generally accepted as being of social construction, the debate over whether sex is also an invention of society is still rampant, both in regards to feminism and sociology in its entirety.

While the question itself is founded in the emerging view of sex as being socially and culturally constructed, this idea is far from a simple one, and is worth discussing in its own right. Feminists and similarly-minded social scientists claim that anatomical sex is socially constructed. However, this statement is misleading, as it is open to wide interpretation, and its most literal meaning is not what advocates of the theory truly mean. A more accurate representation would be to say that the requirement for sex to be dichotomous is a social construct; though there are evolutionary reasons for there being two polar sexes, this in no way rules out the existence of intermediary sexual identities, or even implies that they are innately "bad". This representation of sex is a clear example of a map-territory mismatch, in which the representation of an object is considered to be the object. In this case, society has skewed what it means to be "male" and "female" to the extent that the words mean far more than simply who possesses sperm and who possesses eggs (even external genitalia are largely irrelevant from a biological perspective). While males and females may be predisposed to certain attributes, activities or attitudes, this is not the same as saying that those qualities are preferable. Though some feminists fail to convey this concept clearly, well-regarded authors such as Judith Butler have clarified this point (even going so far as to write a text "in part as a rethinking of some parts of Gender Trouble that have caused confusion" (Butler, 1993, p. xii). It should also be noted that the perceptions that feminists and sociologists suggest should stripped from the definition of "sex" are not mutually exclusive from those that are suggested to be removed from "gender", as both definitions suffer from similar misconstructions. 

This does not nullify their conceptual differences though - "sex" should only refer to biological predispositions, and "gender" should really not exist at all, though this is far from reality. In defence of this claim, an evidentiary approach is not required, as the question can be solved purely through philosophical thinking - when defining "anatomical sex", the phrase itself is the definition - there is no need to elaborate or complicate the matter. The fact that this is not true in reality is not evidence to contrary, simply that society is imperfect. In regards to "gender", the word exists to distinguish between masculine and feminine traits, but why is this necessary? As Henslin, Possamai and Possamai-Inesedy state, "you learn your gender as you are socialised into the behaviours and attitudes your culture asserts are appropriate for your [biological] sex" (Henslin et al., 2011, p. 310). From this definition, it is clear that "gender" is exclusively a limiting term, with nothing gained from its existence except to further confine people into an arbitrary category as defined through nonsensical traditions, and a general lack of understanding. Though this philosophical approach solidifies the principle of the issue, sociologists do attempt to provide evidence for the reality of today's world (as they should) - that sex and gender is either biological or social. 

Evidence does exist, but unfortunately neither side has a definitive evidentiary argument, and this is explored in "Sociology: A Down-to-Earth Approach". In support of the biological approach to sex and gender, Steven Goldberg claims that the anthropological record for past and present societies shows the highest statuses are associated with men, and that this is because they are more willing "to sacrifice the rewards of other motivations... in order to attain dominance and status" (Henslin et al., 2011, p. 314). While these points have most certainly been true throughout history, the argument as a whole relies on a post-hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy - that simply because men are biologically male, and that men have always held the majority of power throughout history, their biology must have been the cause of their power, irrespective of the fact that no link between these two points actually exists. Goldberg goes on to further degrade himself by relying on hyperbole and ad hominem arguments to defend his claim: that any interpretation other than his is "wrongheaded, ignorant, tendentious, internally illogical, discordant with the evidence and implausible in the extreme". 

Fortunately, proponents of the culturally constructed view of sex and gender are aware of this, with sociologists such as Cynthia Epstein stating that genetically based arguments are simplistic, and "rest on a dubious structure of inappropriate, highly selective and poor data, over simplification in logic and in inappropriate inferences by use of analogy" (Henslin et al., 2011, p. 313). Conversely, Epstein's evidence includes anthropological records which show greater equality between men and women in nomadic and hunter-gatherer societies. While the existence of societies in which men and women are equal does not prove that sex is socially constructed, it does disprove that someone's sex prevents them from effectively carrying out a task typically done by the opposite sex, or that they are innately prevented from doing so. Epstein goes on to say that female crime rates are currently rising in many parts of the world, though her claim that this implies equal biological aggression levels between the sexes has yet to be proven. So while there are sociologists on both sides of the metaphorical fence, the evidentiary grass on the societal side of the fence is currently greener. Given this, it can thusly be seen for what purpose feminists and sociologists argue for a redefining of not only gender, but now also sex.

With these two polarised concepts of sex in mind, the issue of intersexuality and transsexualism becomes vastly more intricate and potentially more controversial. In modern society with our advancements in medicine, intersexuality is considered a deformity which can be "cured". The child's gender isn't considered "intersexual", but rather undecided, with parents strongly recommended to choose for their child to be either "male", or "female". This is another clear example of the social construction of the dichotomy of sex, in which being intersexual just isn't considered a rational choice. But why not? Being atypical is not a reason, but rather an excuse to not have to face the unusual. This is especially enlightening, given that 1 in 500-2000 babies are born intersexual (Raskoff, 2009). As Sally Raskoff puts it, "We accept that hair and eye colour varies and that those characteristics have no implicit meaning yet we can’t seem to do the same for biological sex". This issue becomes especially important when considering activities in which the physical differences between males and females does make a difference, such as sport. In the 2008 Olympics, eight female athletes were found to have male chromosomes (XY), but where reinstated when it was determined that they were "physiologically female" (Kozlowski, 2009). Even though it is clear that intersex is a natural part of biology, intersexual people will continue to be predominately arbitrarily placed into one of the two polar categories that we have constructed for ourselves.

Transsexualism is another example of an issue for which a social construction of sex would have deep implications. It is also an example of how gender can be much more powerful than sex, as transsexuals would rather sacrifice their physical characteristics than sacrifice what gender their mind tells them they are. While those ignorant to the complexities of transsexualism may consider it to be more of a choice (not dissimilar to considering one's sexual orientation as a choice), it is widely believed that transsexuals are born with their gender identity, and it simply does not match up with their sex. Through this, the social construction of gender can also be brought into question, though that is a topic for another day. In evidence of this theory, a recent case reached the news on 18th April of this year in which a ten year old Australian boy has been cleared to receive "puberty-blocking hormone therapy" (Akersten, 2011). This makes him "Australia's youngest gender-change case". He has been living and dressing as a girl for the past two years, and has no anatomical deformities - he simply believes himself to be gendered as a girl, even though his sex is that of a boy. "There are a growing number of cases around the world of pre-teenage children, who live as the opposite gender to their biological one, getting puberty-blocking horomoes" (Akerston, 2011), and this raises numerous questions about not only the nature of biological sex, but even its relevancy - "it is easier to change your physical body than your gender identity" (Partapuoli, 2008). By undergoing a sex operation, they are not changing their biological sex (they cannot change their chromosomes, and their new genitals do not function as "true" genitals) - they are only changing their socially constructed sex. They are altering their bodies in order "to 'pass' as a gender that does not fit with their original biological sex... They merely uphold the distinction society makes between men and women" (Partapuoli, 2008). Therefore,  by using the new definition of sex proposed by feminists, transsexuals are relying on their socially constructed gender in order to alter their socially constructed sex - their biological sex does not change. If sex is not considered to be socially constructed, then the only way to reconcile the issue of transsexualism is to consider them a "third" sex, and this in itself is not a biological answer.

In conclusion, it is clear that feminism's changing views on sex has potentially vast implications for numerous aspects of society. By changing the definition of "sex", a completely new way of thinking must be implemented, and though difficult, this opens up concepts that were previously unheard of, and pushes sociological study forward. This progress is already visible in areas such as intersex and transsexualism, in which without the notion of sex as a construction of the culture it finds itself in, the issues cannot be fully explained, with gaps appearing when a biological definition of sex is used. One can only hope that society learns to become more self-aware, and realises the difference between what is "true", and what is simply a creation of the collective consciousness.

Reference List

• Akersten, M. (18 April 2011). Gender therapy for Oz 10-year-old. Retrieved from http://www.samesame.com.au/news/local/6687/Gender-therapy-for-Oz-10-year-old.htm

• Butler, J. (1993). Bodies That Matter - On The Discursive Limits of "Sex". New York, Routledge.

• Esplen, E., Jolly, S. (December 2006). Gender and Sex: A sample of definitions. Retrieved from www.iwtc.org/ideas/15_definitions.pdf

• Geertz, C. (1983). Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology, New York: Basic Books.

• INSTRAW, Glossary of Gender-related Terms and Concepts  

www.un-instraw.org/en/index.php?option=content&task=view&id=37&Itemid=76

• Kozlowski, L. (August 21, 2009 ). " 'Between XX and XY: Intersexuality and the Myth of Two Sexes' by Gerald Callahan". LA Times. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/entertainment/news/la-et-intersex21-2009aug21,0,7389608.story

• Money, J. (1955). Hermaphroditism, gender and precocity in hyperadrenocorticism: Psychologic findings. Bulletin of the Johns Hopkins Hospital.

• Partapuoli, K. (3 January 2008). The sex/gender distinction with reference to the so-called third sex. In Woman/man as cross cultural categories. Retrieved from http://www.partapuoli.com/Texts/Gender_third_sex.htm

• Raskoff, S. (31 August 2009). The Social Construction of Sex: Intersex as Evidence. Retrieved from http://nortonbooks.typepad.com/everydaysociology/2009/08/the-social-construction-of-sex-intersex-as-evidence.html

• World Health Organization. (2002). Gender and Reproductive Rights: Working Definitions. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/reproductive-health/gender/sexual_health.html#1